This article explores Peter Singer's argument, in Famine, Affluence, and Morality, that we have moral obligations to those in need. His explanation of his argument and his conclusion, if accepted, would dictate changes to our lifestyle as well as to our conceptions of duty and charity, and would be particularly demanding of the rich. In response to the central case presented by Singer, John Kekes offers his own version, which labels and highlights some objections. The revisions to the principle provide some answers to the objections, but raise further problems. However, in the end, the revisions provide support for Singer's fundamental argument that, in some way, we should help those in need. Singer presents his argument specifically in terms of famine relief, and while it has broader applicability, the discussion falls primarily under this specific topic. Therefore, when he lays out his three basic premises, he adapts his argument to the relevant aspects of famine and/or poverty. The first premise of his argument (P1) states that most people would agree with this premise, regardless of their specific reasoning. Linking suffering and death to the lack of basic needs seems clear and its characterization as negative seems to be in line with our common sense. However, some may still object for reasons that would be difficult or impossible to refute. Despite such objections, the premise can be accepted and those who disagree should walk away at this point. The second premise (P2) states that the challenge here is not in preventing something bad since that would seem rather incontrovertible given our acceptances of P1. But the sacrifice clause requires clarification before proceeding. It means, from a moral point of view, c...... in the center of the card...... themselves. By adding additional conditions or exceptions we could address specific objections and create more precisely defined obligations. Further changes to the PP' would not generally eliminate the obligations, but would allow choices to be made. For the wealthy in particular, doing nothing remains off limits, so they would still be expected to do what they can to alleviate suffering in places where they agree that help is justified. This derivation from the original argument plausibly supports the basic argument made by Singer that we should do everything in our power to help those in need as long as we do not have to sacrifice anything significant. Works Cited Kekes, John (2002). On the supposed obligation to alleviate the famine. Philosophy 77 (4):503-517. Singer, Peter (1972). Famine, wealth and morality. Philosophy and public affairs 1 (3):229-243.