It is important to distinguish between the types of values ​​of freedom, because in defining a system of government, the attitude towards freedom is a key component. If freedom has no independent value, different schools of political thought might take the view that we should not value freedom at all, but only what it is intended for. Some may think they know best what is good for people and feel justified in limiting people's freedom. We intuitively value freedom, and usually don't even realize we have it, because it is woven into so much of our daily lives. We take freedom for granted, even if in some countries it is not so trivial. It is not enough to feel that freedom is our fundamental right, but to understand why it is so important and why freedom cannot be replaced by the specific ends to which one might think it is a means. I will argue that freedom has an independent value. First I will talk about the non-independent value of freedom and look at the different independent values, then I will focus on the non-specific instrumental value. I will examine the claims where Dworkin and Kymlicka were wrong and evaluate Ian Carter's view. We can define freedom positively or negatively. The first definition would be linked to self-realization and being free from internal obstacles, while the second definition focuses on being free from external constraints, i.e. no one interferes with our freedom, at least not arbitrarily, since we need some rules to live in a society. In this essay I will assume a negative concept. Philosophical value can be divided into two types of value. Non-independent value, which is specific instrumental value. If something has non-independent value, it has value with reference to the condition of humanity, it involves learning and the result is the discovery of what is still unknown. And it seems that progress is greatest when freedom is present, in other words we cannot get the most out of ourselves if we have constraints. So by the definition of progress, we can't say what benefit it will bring us, but it will do something generally valuable. So freedom is really precious. Not many object to the non-independent value of freedom, since there are many values ​​for which freedom is essential. In my view, freedom also has independent value, because we may not know exactly what will be good for us, but Works Cited The Independent Value of Freedom Ian Carter Ethics Vol. 105, No. 4 (July 1995), pp. 819-845Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable Article URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2382113