Applies ONE theory of the causes of political conflicts to ONE case of real-world conflict to help explain why/how the conflict occurred.IntroductionWhile there are many theories to which can be drawn upon to explain the context and outbreak of a political conflict, this article will focus on the “misperception theory”. The main objectives of this article are to clearly document and explain different aspects of misperception theory, effectively explore the various means by which decisions based on this theory can influence state policy and state welfare, and reveal how exactly misperception theory can help scholars understand how and why conflict erupts. This article will use misperception theory to illustrate how and why the United States and Britain overestimated Saddam Hussein's military pedigree and threat to the government of Iraq. Their misperception of the situation eventually led the two superpowers to join forces and invade the Gulf state in 2003. Introduction to the theory of misperceptionClearly understand and explain how the invasion of Iraq by the United States and Great Britain in 2003 can be considered an example of the theory of misperception, we must first understand exactly what the theory of misperception entails and encompasses. It is crucial to understand how exactly misperception theory can lead to conflict and how an influential state leader can misperceive a situation/event. A common definition of misperception theory describes it as “the gap between the world as it actually exists and the world as it is.” exists in the mind of the perceiver” (Duelfer and Dyson, 2011). This definition, however, depends on a crucial assumption, namely that there is both a single objective reality and multiple subjective realities. The key difference... at the heart of the document... ours is therefore considered evidence of this malign intent. The “enemy image” becomes resistant to change and extremely difficult to discredit. Therefore, information received from state leaders that is consistent with this “enemy image” must pass a much lower perceptual threshold to attract the leader's attention (Duelfer and Dyson, 2011). The next consequence is that the decision maker, usually the leader of the state, can then make a decision based on this information. The “enemy image” has become so ingrained, and the response so automatic, that the state leader may inadvertently misunderstand the situation and view the enemy as a much greater threat than it actually is. President Bush fell victim to this process in his assessment of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and launched the invasion of Iraq based on this misperception 2003.