Mediation is a type of negotiation that involves third parties. According to Jakob Berkovic, "provisions of some forms of third-party mediation have recently been discovered in the Amarna Letters (referring to the reign of King Amenhotep IV approximately 3,500 years ago). 1 References to the structures are found in the Bible, Homer's Iliad, Sophocles' Ajax, Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet. This method of conflict management was also known in ancient China, the Greek city-state system, Renaissance diplomacy, and so on. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay During the First Hague Conference in 1899, Article 2 of the Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes was signed. "In the event of a serious disagreement or dispute, before the call to arms, the signatories undertake to resort to good offices or mediation with one or more friendly countries, Circumstances." In the contemporary legal system, the most important legal basis for this form of conflict management is Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which states: "Parties to a conflict, the continuation of which is likely to jeopardize the maintenance of the law international peace and security, solution through negotiation, investigation, mediation or the fulfillment of an arbitration or judicial solution, the use of regional agencies or agreements or other peaceful means of their choice. However, theoretical studies have not demonstrated only in the second half of the twentieth century and the atheist of the twentieth century The most prominent mediators who use their work or ideas in this article are Ellen Papeet, John H. Barton, Jacob Berkovic, Melanie J. Greenberg, Margaret. E. McGuinness, Jeffrey G. Robin, Lawrence Suskind, Saadia Toffal, and William Zartman The major difference of opinion regarding the “mature” nature of litigation for third-party participation and the utility of using reward and coercive force discussed in text is detected on the basis of national experience. Regarding Qatar mediation, the most important research used here critically is the work of Sultan Barakat, Andrew F. Cooper, Mohammed Hass Gass, Hansen, Mehran Kamrava, Halvard Lira, Basma Momani, Sarah Bolam, David B Roberts and Christian Coates Ulrichsen. The main difference of opinion was found on issues related to the reasons for national mediation and some of its tools and techniques discussed below. Before focusing on Qatar mediation, it is important to recognize some nuances. First, the term "mediation" is used here in the definition of J. Bercovich, id est, "[. . . ] the process of conflict management, which is related to but different from the efforts of the parties themselves, where the conflicting parties or their representatives request assistance, or accept an offer of assistance, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, conceive or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force or invoking the power of law." Secondly , as it follows from the accepted definition, mediation is the process of managing conflict, not just a solution to conflict. The reasons for using this tool can be different; for example, reduce stress. As M. as a mediator, "mediation is necessary, but in itself it is not a sufficient element to resolve conflicts". Mediation is therefore a tool for conflict management and has different forms of implementation depending on the context of the conflict, the nature of the parties, the mediator (intermediaries), etc. Qatar's mediation as an instrument of its foreign policyQatar became independent only in 1971 Verybefore independence, the Al-Thani dynasty continued to face the dilemma of the so-called small state. Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani solved this problem by counting on the protection of Saudi Arabia. The situation changed only in 1995 when Sheikh Hamad binKhalifa al-Thani became a new emir after the bloody coup. He changed the country's foreign policy and introduced innovations. To understand the role of mediation in foreign affairs, we need to discover the cornerstone of Qatar's foreign policy. Henry Lira criticizes in his article the approach that explains the application of the Doha foreign policy from the point of view of the security of a small country as insufficient. "If Qatar has achieved maximum security, [. . . ] we should expect to see a more coherent policy towards both the dominant external powers (the United States) and the local superpowers (Saudi Arabia and Iran)", the maintenance of the system for reasons and reasons for foreign policy actions in Doha. Maintaining the regional system of international relations is in line with Qatar's utmost security. Maintaining regional order as a principle of state sovereignty as a fundamental principle of international law guarantees the security concerns of this lily. Mediation facilitates the enhancement of the image of a peace mediator, a champion of peace. These principles can also serve to maintain the regional system. Furthermore, the current state of the regional balance of power is critical to Qatar's survival. The 1991 Gulf War clearly led to this conclusion because Kuwait is a small country in the same region. Qatar's mediation in Yemen, Lebanon and Darfur can be interpreted as part of the strategy to limit the growth of Iranian proxies. However, it is doubtful whether it is among the main reasons for such interference. Ensuring security is therefore the primary objective of Qatar's foreign policy. The other foreign policy goal of the march is influence or leadership. The second and third circles of recognition, where Qatar presents itself as "a state that works for the unity of the Arab world and Muslims" [11], and the fourth, which seeks to be the first among equals of small states , aim to take action to achieve this goal. . Doha has the wealth and resources to influence the regional system of international relations. Trying to take advantage of available opportunities. As a result, you can also get a safer environment this way. Mediation can be another tool to achieve this goal. The effect can also be enhanced by soft power. Economic liberalization in Qatar has not only facilitated the diversification of the country's economy and the accumulation of vast amounts of wealth. Political reforms here were imposed from the top down and people were not forced to do so. General suffrage was introduced in 1999; the ruling family council was established in 2000; in 1995, elections were held for the Central Municipal Council for Voting and Voting for Women. However, as S. Williams admits, "it was only in 2003 that a woman was elected to the CMC" 12. Due to uncertainty over the results of the Shura elections, the latter were postponed. This means that the reforms aim at soft power. Mediation can be another tool of the latter. Article 7 of the 2003 Constitution provides that Qatar's foreign policy is "based on the principle of promoting international peace and security by promoting the peaceful resolution of international disputes". Mediation strengthens the soft power of the libote. In his famous work "The Art of Negotiating with Sovereign Rulers", François de Cagliere observed that "nothing[if not mediation] is more appropriate to raise the reputation of its power and make it respectable by all nations". This soft power also contributes to the legitimacy of the emirate on the international stage, its status and its position on the world stage, and thus can strengthen Qatar's influence and security. State branding is a strategy to multiply and amplify Presbyterian efforts in soft power and influence. Qatar publishes its attractive image this image is Al Jazeera, which was founded in 1996 and began broadcasting in English in 2006. Officially, the media network is independent and free from censorship. However, it depends on state funding and therefore "self-censorship continues to play an important role ". 15. The regime tightened control of the island when its director, Wadah Khanfar, was replaced in 2011 by Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassem al-Thanks. Furthermore, Sheikh Hamad Bin Thamer Al Thani is the president of Al Jazeera Media Network. Therefore, the channel provides an important image for the emirate's influence and soft power. The mediation of concrete conflicts is always accompanied by Al Jazeera broadcasts. Based on the above, it can be concluded that the main objectives of Qatar's foreign policy are its security and impact. For the former, the main contributors were the maneuvering efforts, the maintenance of the regional system, the economic and financial aspects of survival. For the latter, the emirate exploits opportunities and efforts to gain soft power that also contributes to its legitimacy and prestige. Mediation is only a tool to achieve these goals and objectives. Conflict resolution is not a major driver of mediation. Reducing tension in most cases is sufficient to provide an image of a neutral peace broker, security and influence. In the next section, the country's tools, resources and modus operandi are analysed. Next, the circumstances necessary to ease tensions and the reasons for Doha mediation in major conflict resolution cases are discussed. The findings are based on the comparative analysis of mediation in Lebanon in 2008, between Hamas and Fatah in 2006 and 2012, in Yemen in 2008, 2010 and 2011, between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2010 and in Darfur in 2008-2011. It should be noted that separate case studies are not relevant to the focus of this paper. It is used here as a source and to the extent that it provides the basis for answering the second part of the research question above (since the first answer has already been answered). Required Elements for Conflict Mediation in Qatar Second-Level Stakeholders Qatar's mediation experience reveals that dealing with second-level stakeholders is critical to effective conflict management. This is what Hans Hansen calls window opportunity. In most mediation cases, Qatar has not been a key option for the facilitator. It spoke only when other states agreed or were not against it. In Palestine, Doha mediated after the failure of Egypt (pro-Fatah) in 2006, Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia in 2008. Friendly relations with the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) contributed to the conclusion of Doha agreement in 2012. Doha's participation in the conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea It was only possible because “Ethiopia had few levers”. 16. However, the most obvious example is Yemen. The results of national efforts made in 2008 and 2010 to mediate Saada's war failed due to, among other things, Saudi Arabia's negative attitude towards them. However, the interventionjoint of 2011 led to the admission of a. Valid. Furthermore, it is recognized for. Suskind and me. “The mediator must understand the interests of these second-tier parties and consult them during the negotiations.” In Lebanon, only after "the prince telephoned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad... did [Hezbollah negotiators] announce their agreement to the terms of the agreement." 18 Thus, the window of opportunity, acceptance of the mediation itself and its results by the second- It is vital to the success of conflict mediation. Inclusion and cohesion of conflicting parties The need to involve a wide range of actors in the mediation process is often highlighted in the mediation literature. Such integration is important for conflict resolution. However, for conflict management it is sufficient to involve the main adversaries, the parties to the conflict. In Darfur, the failure to manage the conflict was due, among other things, to unsuccessful attempts to involve the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a crucial body in the struggle, after signing an agreement of the Sudanese government with the Movement of Liberation and Justice. The situation in Yemen reveals the need for cohesion of the conflicting parties. Qatar's failure to involve all tribes in the process largely contributed to the resumption of fighting in 2008. Impartial or Acceptable MediatorThe issue of integrity is one of the most contentious issues. On the one hand, "[. . . ] it seems that the choice of mediator depends [. . . ] more than anything else, on neutrality and impartiality" 19, according to JH Barton and MC Greenberg. On the other hand, S. Touval and W. Zartman point out that "the only partial mediator [. . . ] would be credible in this context". However, in the latter case, the other party must consider the facilitator impartial, or at least not an enemy. In 2011, a. It is positive that Qatar distances itself from the peace process, 21 because it is no longer considered neutral and acceptable. Qatar's relations with Hamas, Hezbollah and various parts of Sudan, mainly through humanitarian aid or other forms of aid, have made it acceptable as a facilitator in the future. SJ Hansen claims that Doha was partial to Lebanon and Palestine. However, it was still acceptable because it maintained positive contacts not only with Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Iran but also with Israel and the United States, etc. Mediation will not be possible if Qatar is not accepted as a friend or at least not as an enemy. from two or more parties. “The parties can trust the third [Qatar],” 22 according to Jeffrey R. Perridge. In the conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea, Doha had friendly relations with both countries. During the Saada war, Qatar was liked by Salih, who supported it in the 1994 and 1996 uprisings in the Hanish and Hutian conflicts as an alternative to Saudi Arabia despite the asymmetry in its relations with the parties. Furthermore, "certain places are chosen for negotiations because [...] they are neutral territory." [23] Doha is a kind of place like the capital of an independent and neutral state. The Arab Spring changed the concept of Doha as not part-time. He began to take a stand in Libya by calling for military intervention against Gaddafi as well as in Syria by arming the rebels. It could have a negative impact on Qatar's future facilitation efforts. It also shows that mediation is just a strategy and tool for foreign policy in Doha. Soft power and influence by exploiting other opportunities which resulted in a more active and partial position of Qatar in Libya and Syria. At the same time, the new emir, Sheikh Tamim, seeks to regain his image as an honest broker. Therefore, the success of conflict mediation strongly depends on the existence of an opportunity, consultations with interested partiessecond level, from the perception of the facilitator at least not as an enemy, and from the involvement and cohesion of the key parties. Reasons for Conflict Resolution FailureA) Stalemate in Conflict ResolutionThe debate about the right time and diplomatic momentum of third-party participation reveals the complexity and uniqueness of each particular case. JZ Rubin points out that "at least in principle third-party intervention can occur at any time." On the other hand, JH Barton and MC Greenberg refer to William Zartman, who points out that effective mediation can only be achieved when an "impasse" is reached. I agree with JZ Robin in the sense of success of mediation and reduction of tension in the short term. However, to resolve the long-term conflict, George Zartman's case is crucial. The most obvious example in national practice corresponding to this problem is the case of Yemen. R. Saleh did not see the stalemate. And the negotiations were carried out only to "please local and international observers". Therefore, the fighting resumed again when "Riyadh pumped money into the Yemeni army and allied tribes." 27. In Lebanon there was no stalemate in the conflict: Hezbollah was the lateral victory. However, the emirate mediated the management of the conflict, which lasted until 2010, due to the parties' desire to prevent the conflict from escalating into civil war. However, the dispute was not resolved because the final agreement did not focus on structural transformations but on the redistribution of votes in parliament. Therefore, stalemate, which is harmful to exchange, is an essential element in resolving the conflict, although it is not part of its management. B) Power of reward Another controversial issue in the theory and practice of mediation is the use of reward and coercive force by the facilitator. The former is emphasized here, as Qatar possesses this only due to its vast wealth. It is one of six types of resources distinguished by John R.B. French and Bertram Ravin: knowledge, reward, coercion, reference, legitimacy, experience, and information. J. Bercovitch vJ. Z. Rubin recognizes the value of using rewards if the facilitator has such resources. However, J. H. Barton and M. C. Greenberg note that even if "external pressure has led to a successful short-term agreement [...] the implementation of such agreements has often been problematic and requires greater external pressure and enforcement." 28. If the parties conclude a settlement only because of the benefits expected from the mediator, when the parties end there is no other reason to maintain the terms of the Agreement. This does not resolve the conflict which must change the perception of the conflict mediator and the other party, but it can be useful in reducing tension. Qatar created a $2 billion joint venture fund with Libya to "neutralize potential Libyan spoilers" of $29 billion to $2 billion for Darfur. Qatar also pledged $500 million in reconstruction aid in Saada province. He was the largest investor in southern Lebanon. Provided $300 million for reconstruction. In other cases, Doha has also used this influence. Therefore, national practice shows that reward power can help successfully mediate conflicts but not resolve long-term conflicts. In most cases, the violence reappeared after a certain period of time. C) Lack of a follow-up mechanism Most authors agree that Qatar does not have a follow-up mechanism. When tension drops, Doha finishes its work. As a result, violence may reappear in the future. It is not the only reason for the failure of conflict resolution. Violence.