IndexMoscow's involvement and the importance of Soviet satellitesThe establishment of the Truman DoctrineHow the Truman Doctrine succeededWhere the Truman Doctrine failedConclusionThe former dependence on British supplies (The Truman Doctrine: contain communism with Modernity). It can be argued that it was the combination of political and economic vulnerability that led to increased foreign intervention in Greece, which is true because EAM/ELAS, EDES and KKE needed foreign assistance to overcome the other. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essayMoscow's involvement and the importance of Soviet satellitesMeanwhile, in the Soviet Union, Stalin took a more conservative approach to aiding the EAM/ELAS, as opposed to how the British did with EDES. Although he was more than motivated to expand Soviet spheres of influence in Greece, Stalin did not want to provoke the United States. This was because he knew that Soviet assistance to the Greek communists would break the percentage agreement made at Yalta, which guaranteed free elections in Greece (Kennedy, 859). Moscow, however, took advantage of Eastern Bloc countries, particularly Yugoslavia, as a way to avoid direct involvement. The Soviets strategically used Yugoslavia to dispense propaganda throughout Greece, such as the pro-communist radio “Free Greece” and the Soviet newspaper “Izvestia” (Marantzidis, 45). Furthermore, Yugoslavia administered a large amount of weapons, ammunition and supplies to the KKE forces (Marantzidis, 32). Yugoslavia, however, was not the only puppet in Stalin's plan. Located just north of Greece, both Albania and Bulgaria supported the communist Greeks. Albania, for example, accepted that four hundred KKE cadres took refuge in its country, and later facilitated the transfer of Greek communist camps to Balkan guerrilla camps, preventing the EDES authorities from repressing the build-up of forces communists (Marantzidis, 25). . Indeed, the EDES forces, which controlled southern Greece, were quickly overrun by the three Soviet satellites supporting the communist agenda. The reason why Stalin refrained from marching the Red Army into Greece to eliminate EDES is complex and widely shared. As historian Bruce Kuniholm suggests, Stalin was unsure of the strength of the Communist Party in Greece. If the party were strong, Stalin would not need to act directly. However, if the party was weak, more involvement would be necessary, thus attracting the attention of the United States (Kuniholm, 105). While it can be argued that Stalin did not take direct action in Greece because he did not want to provoke the United States, this is only partly true, as Stalin was unsure of what kind of influence was needed. This is supported by Kuniholm's theory of a warning Stalin in Greece. Simply put, Stalin was less concerned with a pre-established strategy in Greece, and more concerned with not provoking the United States. This supports the evidence that Stalin relied on satellite forces in supporting the communist uprising, rather than direct involvement. Although Stalin relied heavily on Eastern Bloc countries in his pursuit of a communist Greece, this is not to say that he had no control. about what each country has done. Indeed, Stalin ensured that every political decision was made under Soviet advice. The first example of this is found in the “Lakes Plan (Limnes)”, drawn up in April 1947 and approved by the KKE in September of the same year. This created an army of 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers to take thecontrol of northern Greece, using Thessaloniki (Greece's second largest city) as a foothold. Although the plan was created by the KKE and its Eastern Bloc allies, it had to be approved by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (The Truman Doctrine and the beginnings of the Global Strategy). Approving the plans was not the only way Moscow gained control over Greek communist forces. Moscow also held secret meetings with the KKE, providing their forces with strategies and advice. The Soviet Union suggested a two-pronged strategy to their Greek counterparts, urging them to continue political agitation and prepare for frequent armed struggle (Marantzidis, 26). The KKE often disagreed with Soviet advice, and Stalin was unprepared for this kind of resistance. For example, when the Central Committee suggested the use of caution in some conflicts with the EDES, the KKE instead opted for greater force. When the Central Committee continued to urge Greek communists to be cautious, so as not to provoke U.S. attention, some agitated Greek communist leaders struggled to seize power and seek direct support from the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union took power in Greece, President Harry Truman knew that immediate action was needed. Unfortunately for Truman, it would likely be difficult to gain public support for intervention in Greece, as US citizens had grown up to enjoy the thriving war economy created by World War II (Kennedy). Americans were in no hurry to be thrust into a war they knew nothing about, and Truman also believed that a Third World War should be avoided at all costs, which meant that his actions had to appear to be in favor of freedom, but not anti-communist. surface waves and deeper currents). Furthermore, the United States now had an obligation to the policies of the United Nations and had to ensure that these were as non-adversarial as possible towards the Soviet Union, which had cautiously acted according to the same guidelines. If the United States had behaved hostilely toward the Soviet Union, or pushed for democratic government in Greece, then Stalin could easily have leveled charges of imperialism in Washington. ((The Truman Doctrine and the Beginnings of Global Strategy.) However, Truman devised a plan that would undermine Soviet action in Greece. To avoid a violation of the United Nations Charter, or loss of public support, President Truman did not acted militaristically and instead worked to win over Greeks by improving opinion of democracy. The project that carried out Truman's plans in Greece became known as the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was created strategically to carry out pro-democracy propaganda. through various anti-communist documents, and at the same time gave Greece the economic assistance it desperately needed. To avoid accusations of imperialism, EDES sent a formal request for help to the United States (The Truman Doctrine and the Beginnings of global strategy With pressure from the UN to remain anti-imperialism, Truman formally announced his policy of containment in a speech on March 12, 1947. In his speech, Truman stated that not only was the Greek army "poor equipped" and in need of "...supplies and equipment if it is to restore the government's authority over all Greek territory” but, more importantly, proclaimed that the United Nations could not handle the matter due to lack of funds ( the Truman Doctrine). To gain public support for a Greek intervention, Truman needed to show heexplained to the American people why involvement was necessary, stating that "the situation is urgent and requires immediate action, and the United Nations and related organizations are not in a position to provide assistance of the kind requested" (The Truman Doctrine) Truman also stated that U.S. involvement in Greece would be temporary, which not only helped gain public support but was also a way to tame Soviet suspicion of a takeover of Greece. However, Truman confidently stated that the United States' objective in Greece was to "help free peoples maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements seeking to impose totalitarian regimes on them" (The Truman Doctrine ). This was, however, a direct attack on Soviet communist pressure on Greece. Finally, Truman declared that the goal of the Truman Doctrine was to give financial support to Greece and train Greek officials to govern the country without fear. and the US conflict, not a Soviet-UN conflict. The intervention in Korea was similar to the Greek one in that in both proxy wars, Communist forces worked to gain the upper hand over Western forces. Furthermore, in both Greece and Korea, communist forces gained support from their Soviet allies. In Korea, Kim Il Sung was supported by the Chinese Communist Party, while the Greek KKE and EAM/ELAS were supported by Eastern Bloc satellite countries. It can be argued that the United States' lack of UN military aid was ultimately beneficial in fighting the Greek civil war, which is true because in Korea the use of the UN military was not as helpful as expected. In fact, the Korean War ended in a draw in 1953. Therefore, it can be clearly seen that even when the United Nations was equipped to provide military support, as in the Korean War, it was rendered useless against the overbearing Soviet forces. Although the Korean War had broken out later than the Greek Civil War, in 1950, when the United Nations was more consolidated, it still did not benefit from its military. How the Truman Doctrine Succeeded The Truman Doctrine was successful in its short-term goals. One of the Doctrine's main short-term goals was to expel communist forces from Greece, to prevent them from completely crippling the economy through excessive spending. During the civil war, the GNA was in constant conflict with the KKE, which left the EDES and GNA without the materials that were once distributed by the British. Knowing that without supplies EDES could not suppress EAM/ELAS, Truman established the Truman Doctrine financial aid program. By April 1, 1947, $400 million in economic aid was approved. The United States sent the GNA forces a large amount of cargo, including AT-6 trainer aircraft, 19 minesweepers, 1 patrol boat, 19 landing craft, 1 landing ship, 14 aircraft engines, as well as weapons, ammunition, food and clothes. The Truman Doctrine and the beginnings of the Global Strategy). Probably the most critical part of the success of the Doctrine in Greece was the rigorous money lending procedure. Washington made sure that all funds were properly allocated to all US-run Greek banks, so that there was little chance of exploitation by Greek purchasing agencies and to keep the loans out of the hands of guerrilla forces (( The Truman Doctrine and the Truman Beginnings aimed to ensure that all supplies were used as directed, so that not a cent of U.S. money was wasted armed with war supplies, the GNA felta new confidence in the fight against the KKE Soviet propaganda. Indeed, the Soviets filtered Communist propaganda through “Izvestia” at a greater rate, claiming that US involvement was an act of “capitalist encirclement.” Greek citizens that the US involvement in Greece was exclusively economic and not imperialistic, to help create the opportunity for free elections (The Truman Doctrine and the Beginnings of Global Strategy). It can be argued that Moscow increased its propaganda efforts in Greece because it felt they would lose their grip on the Greek people, which is true because once they obtained financial assistance, EDES gained the upper hand in the war. This was partly because Moscow had overextended itself geographically in an attempt to gain too much of the Eastern Bloc too quickly. At the same time, the Soviets had begun to expand more into East Asia, primarily Korea. Ultimately, this was a fatal move on Moscow's part, as they soon began to lose their hold on Greece. Although Secretary of State Dean Acheson feared that the doctrine had “a military background but not actually military in action,” economic aid and limited military strategy were likely all that was needed to push the KKE out of the country's interior. . the country. In fact, with the renewal of supplies and the support of US forces, EDES managed to push further north and the will of the KKE was shattered (The Truman doctrine and the beginnings of the global strategy). By the time the KKE was expelled from the interior of Greece, the United States had gained control of all major ports. Realizing that the United States had gained a strong position and that there was no longer any way to counter the attacks, Greece's communist radio station announced an end to hostilities, with many fleeing to Albania and Yugoslavia. One of the main reasons why the United States was successful in Greece was the weakening of the relationship between Moscow, satellite suppliers and the Greek guerrillas. As mentioned above, Moscow and the KKE often disagreed on how much force was needed, which ultimately led the KKE to make regrettable and reckless interventions of force (shallow waves and deeper currents). Furthermore, the relationship between Moscow and Yugoslavia weakened as its leader, Josip Tito, gradually sought greater independence from Soviet hegemony, aiding Greece in its energetic efforts against the Western (Britannica) army. In what is known as the Tito-Stalin split, Stalin withdrew Yugoslav support from Greece and Moscow in early 1948, thus withdrawing a key source of supplies to the (British) guerrilla forces. This action reflected Stalin's insecurity in his regime and his constant paranoia, as he no longer trusted the alliance made between the KKE and Yugoslavia. This lack of confidence and the fear of Yugoslav desertion ultimately contributed to the weakening of its hold on Greece, as Western ideals increased in popularity. On the contrary, it can be argued that the real cause of Greek rejection of communism originated from overall post-war Soviet weakness and internal communist contradiction, as well as declining support for EAM/ELAS when US forces were in the advantage. (Contain communism with modernity). This argument is only partly true, since although these factors contributed greatly to the Greek rejection of communism, if it were not for Stalin's lack of faith in his Soviet satellites, then there would not have been a decline in support for the EAM/ ELAS. Ultimately, these factors contributed greatly to the success.