Table of ContentsStatement of Relevant FactsEthical PerspectiveLiability PerspectivePreventive PerspectiveMediaConclusionStatement of Relevant FactsThe 35th Annual Meeting of the Tailhook Association took place at the Las Vegas Hilon in Las Vegas, Nevada, September 8-12, 1991. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, during that time, more than 100 junior U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aviation officers sexually assaulted, harassed, and engaged in other unbecoming conduct toward 83 women and 7 men in what today it is known as the Tailhook '91 scandal. . The crime allegedly took place on the infamous third floor and other sections of the Hilton, where the aforementioned officers abused and molested unsuspecting victims, engaging in glove and other lewd behavior such as streaking, mooning, and “ballwalking.” One victim, Lt. Paula Coughlin, reported being groped and squeezed and, despite her reaction, gang raped. On September 8, Coughlin filed a complaint with his superior, Rear Admiral Snyder. That same month, the Department of the Navy began its investigation into the Tailhook events led by Rear Admiral Duvall Williams of the Naval Investigative Service. The report was published in April 1992 stating that the alleged crimes were simply the fault of the poorly chosen behavior of junior air force officers. The high-ranking flag officers present were not held responsible for condoning this behavior. After 1,500 people were questioned, only two suspects were named: an Australian Air Force officer and a Mississippi Navy captain (Ogden, 6-7). Due to an unsatisfactory investigation, Assistant Secretary of the NAVY Barbara Pope urged Secretary of the Navy Henry L. Garrett III to conduct a more thorough investigation. Garrett agreed, and a second investigation was launched, this time led by Derek J. Vander Schaaf, the IG of the Department of Defense. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay The report was released in September 1992 and accused 140 junior officers of sexual assault and harassment (Ogden, p. 11). As a result, six officers were prosecuted. Two of them, Captain Gregory Bonam, accused of assaulting Coughlin, and Lieutenant Cole Cowden, accused of molesting Navy nurse Elizabeth Warnick, were acquitted of all charges. One lieutenant, Roland Diaz, was found guilty of shaving women's legs and was fined $1,000. The remaining three were acquitted. The rest of the 134 court cases were dropped. Admiral Frank Kelso and Navy officers such as Thomas Miller and Gregory Tritt were accused of failing to stop the junior officers at Tailhook but were never charged. Fifty others were disciplined by the Department of the Navy. Since then, 14 admirals fell from grace and a total of 300 naval aviators were fired and fired (Ogden, 12). Ethical Perspective The ethical dilemma is indisputably clear, at least at first glance. Sexual assault and harassment fundamentally conflict with the ethical obligation of men and women to treat each other with dignity and respect. The young Air Force officers not only violated the rights, but also the autonomy of their male and female victims. And since Navy and Marine Corps officers are model heroes of modern society who are supposed to promote integrity and discipline, their mere behavior of engaging in sexual misconduct, or misconduct of any kind, is highly immoral. The Tailhook scandal is an unfortunate exampleof the hostile attitude and oppression towards military women (Kammer). But the ethical question, after all, is not so clear. For example, the Blue Angels' commanding officer, Bob Stumpf, was denied promotion and retired just for attending Tailhook. In fact, many others who attended Tailhook that year found it difficult to advance and get promoted (Browne, p. 757). Casting a large shadow of ethical repercussions over the entire Tailhook scandal is “damaging to the very fiber of the Navy and Air Force culture” according to John Lehman. The problem is that the ethical burden falls solely on the accused officers. The Department of the Navy's investigation revealed that many of the female "victims" were not victims at all. Many women knowingly participated in the challenges and attended the Tailhook convention with just such intentions. Many witnesses reported that these women enjoyed themselves and were not offended because they repeatedly passed the challenge and smiled and giggled as they did so. A witness testified that a young woman on the flight to Tailhook spoke about the events that occurred around 3 a.m. on the third floor of the Hilton, implying that she knew about them and was headed there to participate (Kammer). The case of Cole Cowden and Elizabeth Warnick is also an eye-opener. The initial charge was that Lt. Cole Cowden, along with two other men, were accused of pushing Elizabeth Warnick onto a bed, stripping her, and grabbing her genitals to gang-rape her. Later, Warnick admitted that she lied about the gang rape and made up the story because she had had consensual sex with Cowden and wanted to hide this misconduct from her boyfriend (Browne, pp. 756-57). The Tailhook scandal still tainted the name of Cowden and others even though he was acquitted of the charges. Initially, there appears to be a clear violation of ethical and moral character on the part of the young Tailhook officers, but the ethical obligations fall away once individual stories come to light. As for the consensual part of Tailhook, do the ethical questions fall on whether the behavior of the men and women as a whole was moral or not? What is unethical, therefore, is the lack of commitment to military preparedness. Tailhook was supposed to be an aviation encounter, not an orgy. Furthermore, the sexual misconduct and lewd behavior in Tailhook hides the more complex issue surrounding the integration of women into the military and their fair treatment (Kammer). Ultimately, if there was one ethical value violated at Tailhook, it was primarily about equal treatment of men and women in the Navy and allowing the events to happen. By ignoring this big picture and instead focusing on the officers' adolescent antics, the Navy not only failed to take responsibility, but reinforced the idea that the allegations were about pesky feminism, and not Navy culture and mindset (Faludi) . Accountability Perspective The ethical perspective reveals that Tailhook's underlying problem lies in accountability, or rather, lack of accountability. High-ranking flag officers, primarily Frank Kelso, the most senior officer present at Tailhook, were not held accountable (and they themselves were not) for the behaviors of their subordinates during the 1991 scandal. extend this failure to Rear Admiral Duvall Williams and Rear Admiral John Gordon, who had abdicated responsibility for conducting a proper and thorough investigation. Specifically, there were four personal lapses in accountability that resulted in the Navy's inadequate investigation ofTailhook: the Under Secretary, the Commander, NIS, the Navy JAG, and the Navy Inspector General. The Under Secretary failed to ensure that the investigation was thorough enough to carefully review the evidence and identify responsible parties. The Under Secretary expressed surprise when he learned that the investigation had been flawed, despite the fact that the failure to pursue leads and interview high-ranking officials was widely known at the time (p. 14). The Commander, NIS, maintained personal and biased opinions throughout the investigative process. He expressed a negative attitude toward working with women, was reluctant to interview high-ranking admirals who participated in Tailhook '91, and consistently pushed for the investigation to end prematurely. However, his suitability to investigate was never questioned (pp. 15-18). NavyJAG not only failed to ensure that the investigation addressed all allegations, it also failed to resolve a conflict of interest. Due to the nature of the JAG and the Under Secretary, the Navy JAG should have refrained from advising the Under Secretary due to his lack of impartiality or appointed another attorney to do so. By doing both, the Navy JAG committed a conflict of interest and failed to be accountable for either (page 19). The Naval IG did not ensure that the final report contained a substantial factual basis (pp. 23-24). Tailhook's gross lack of accountability was perhaps a scandal in itself. This lack of accountability on two levels concerns not only the lack of accountability on the part of senior Tailhook officers to their subordinates, but also the lack of accountability of investigators to interview these senior officers and investigate them properly. As a result, Tailhook revealed a sad reality about the position of women in the Navy and damaged the institution's prestige. Preventive Perspective Since Tailhook has failed on two levels: the crimes and the inadequate initial investigation, there are two solutions to remedy the problem. The first is to create a safe haven for victims of sexual harassment in the Navy, where they can seek assistance and medical support and disclose details of the attack confidentially without launching an investigation. This type of limited reporting has a couple of advantages. First, victims do not have to take legal action to gain access to services. Secondly, victims have more time and control over their personal information and can decide if and when they want to take part in investigations. It would also increase the likelihood of reporting sexual harassment (Friedman, pp. 389-90). One of the main disadvantages of this solution is that, under the limited reporting rules, the attacker remains free until the victim decides to press charges (Friedman, p.391). The purpose of this solution is to provide victims with a wider range of options and freedoms once sexual harassment occurs and to create a victim-friendly environment. The second solution is more preventive in nature and draws attention to the responsibility of the Navy, especially further down the chain of command. High-ranking flag officers must take greater responsibility for their subordinates and be held fully accountable for their actions. Since it is clearly difficult for the Navy, or any other organization, to conduct an investigation against its own senior leaders, this may be accompanied by an internal restructuring of the investigative process in which the Department of the Navy notifies the Department of Defense IG on.