Many criticisms of the current American government are that it fails to do what needs to be done and that it fails to reform what needs to be reformed. These ideas may be very true. In "Government's End," Jonathan Rauch argues that special interests have prevented major changes from coming to government functions or programs. He argues that today's static environment may increasingly end up being America's environment. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original EssayRauch begins by commenting that the 1980s and 1990s appear to be a quieter time after the social and political upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s. But he believes that while society was calmer, disputes in government were masked under the face of discontent. The early 1980s through the mid-1990s were a time of reformism. Rauch believes that reformers in this more modern era have failed to remake government. The government instead remade them. Since the Progressive Era, government has become more open, had more access, and been more professional. Professionalism entered both the civil service and the political class. Congress was made up of 535 individuals, all fighting for their survival. With this development, the economics of the system became dangerous. Lobbies everywhere tried to get what they wanted from politicians. When a politician didn't want to help, the lobby could always go somewhere else. Ultimately, everyone had to have their "two cents worth." Rauch uses the slogan: "If you don't play you can't win, but boy, can you lose!" Rauch points out that by the early 1980s, trust in government had gone the way of dead dinosaurs. Instead of trust there was suspicion and cynicism. Both liberals and conservatives dreamed of reform, but neither could accomplish anything. Whether Republicans or Democrats controlled the presidency, Congress, or it was divided, no one still got much done. The voters got tired and gave up. Newt Gingrich, for Rauch, was a reformer who seemed likely to succeed with his vision of change. He had a plan. He would start by mobilizing his supporters. The opposition party was still in chaos after its stunning defeat in 1994. The president was in shock in the Oval Office. Next, Gingrich wanted to flood the lobbies by attacking more programs than could be saved. He hoped that the numerous defenders would only focus on the things that were important to them. In this way the Republicans could not eliminate everything they wanted, but still a lot. Finally, Gingrich made long-term plans. He felt that trying to get everything at once would accomplish nothing. Newt only got to the second step. Rauch says voters vote for change in theory, while lawmakers actually have to deal with constituencies affected by any change. To counteract the increased amount of energy on the defensive side of the reform, Gingrich thought his fellow Republicans would argue forcefully against it. It's not like that. Everywhere there ended up being a Republican or a Democrat calling for maintaining just one program. Every MP wanted credit for saving something. The reformers were overwhelmed. A small part of the package survived. Public mobilization can work for both sides of the reform issue. Gingrich has found that it is easy for program defenders to convince the public to take their side. All they had to do was say that teachers, pensioners, students,.