Space Shuttle Challenger disaster In January 1986, 7 astronauts were killed when the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded just over a minute into the flight. The solid rocket booster's O-rings failed to seal properly, allowing hot combustible gases to escape from the side of the booster, burning through the external fuel tank. The factors that caused the O-ring to fail are multiple; including faulty design of solid rocket boosters, insufficient low-temperature testing of the O-ring material and the joints with which the O-ring sealed. Lack of proper communication between different levels of NASA management and various ethical issues ultimately led to the disaster. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay SRBs (solid rocket boosters) are key elements in the operation of the space shuttle, without them the shuttle produces insufficient thrust to overcome the Earth's gravitational pull to reach orbit. An SRB is attached to each side of the external fuel tank; each SRB joint is sealed by two O-rings; the lower and upper rings are known as primary and secondary rings respectively. The purpose of the O-rings is to prevent hot combustion gases from escaping from inside the engine. To create a barrier between the rubber O-rings and the combustion gases, a heat-resistant putty is applied to the inside of the joint. In general, solid rockets produce more thrust per pound than their liquid-fueled counterparts. However, there is a disadvantage. Once solid rocket fuel has been ignited, it cannot be turned off, much less controlled. Therefore, it is critical that the shuttle's SRBs have been designed correctly. Launch Delays The first delay of the Challenger mission was due to a weather front that was expected to move into that area, bringing rain and cold temperatures. Usually, a mission is not postponed until the weather enters the zone, however, the Vice President had to be present at the launch and NASA officials wanted to avoid the Vice President having to make an unnecessary trip to Florida, and so they the launch was postponed early. The Vice President was a key spokesperson for the President in the space program, and NASA coveted his goodwill. The weather front stalled; the launch window had perfect conditions, but the launch had already been postponed. As shown in Figure 2², the lowest temperature experienced by O-rings on any previous mission was 53℉, showing no temperature data lower than this recorded temperature. Bob Lund concluded that 53℉ was the only low-temperature data Morton-Thiokol had for the effects of low temperatures on operational boosters, so since his engineers had no low-temperature data below 53℉, they could not prove that it was dangerous to launch at lower temperatures. Another delay was caused by a faulty microswitch in the hatch closing mechanism and problems in removing the hatch handle. However, once these issues were resolved, the winds became too strong and the weather front began to move again, bringing record low temperatures to the Florida area.Analysis of thelaunchAccording to the book 'The Final Voyage', temperatures overnight before launch dropped as low as 8℉, much lower than expected. Safety showers and fire hoses had been activated to prevent freezing of water pipes in the launch pad. Ice had formed all over the platform, so there were concerns that ice would fall off the platform during launch and damage the shuttle's heat-resistant tiles. The ice inspection saw this as a major concern, but the launch director decided to move forward with the countdown. Post Launch Analysis At launch, the impact of the ignition unleashed a shower of ice from the platform, striking the left booster. Although there was no evidence of ice damage on the Orbiter itself, NASA's analysis of the ice problem was wrong. The primary O-ring was too cold to seal properly, the heat-resistant putty protecting the O-rings from the fuel collapsed, and thus gases above 5000℉ burned past both O-rings. Eight hundredths of a second after ignition, the shuttle took off. The camera focused on the right booster and showed approximately 9 puffs of smoke coming from the booster at the rear field joint. Oxides from the burned propellant temporarily sealed the joint before the flames could escape. Issues arising from the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster As young engineering students, what future do we see for professional responsibilities as engineers? Public welfare? Remain faithful to your work? It is important that experienced engineers such as those placed in management positions do not completely ignore their own experience and consider the decisions and understandings of younger practicing engineers. As for technical matters, practicing engineers will be more up-to-date. Another problem is the fact that managers encouraged the launch, due to insufficient cold temperature data. Since there was not enough data to make an informed decision, in their opinion it was not appropriate to abort the launch. In a previous issue, NASA was alerted to problems in the booster's design, but did not halt the program until the problem was resolved. On the one hand, testing the implications of designs is always an important priority to ensure the safety of the shuttle. . However, they must also be aware of their obligation to society to protect public welfare. The public supplied the engineers, through the tax base and legislation. In return, engineers have a responsibility to protect the safety and welfare of the public in all their endeavors. According to the ASME Code of Ethics, the first canon urges engineers to "consider the safety, health, and welfare of the public paramount in the performance of their professional duties." The welfare and safety of the public should be at the top of the priority list. While corporate loyalty is important, it should not override the engineer's obligations to the public. If engineers demonstrated the utmost selfish or altruistic loyalty towards engineering, it could lead to the most unfortunate consequences. Ethical Issues of the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster Professional Responsibility One of the major ethical issues was the professional responsibility of design engineers. Design engineers have a responsibility to keep designs flawless and professional, however, there are implications such as the costs of building and obtaining items to complete the project. Since the design team projectcould potentially delay the completion of the scheduled Challenger shuttle mission, the execution window was very short. From an ethical standpoint, it seemed like the rushed schedule portrayed the management team as not even being concerned about the astronaut's safety. According to software and recent Challenger historian Richard Feynman, it seemed that engineering could only be as good as management. . For the Challenger to become a more complete design, management would have to agree and listen to the issues raised by the engineers; they simply ignored the problems. Yes, the engineers had to work under a time limit, but the management team stood in their way of doing what they were capable of. Effective Communication Another major ethical factor that contributed to the disaster was the lack of effective communication between engineers and management. After the incident, Roger Boisjoly, an engineer who worked for Morton-Thiokol, said the challenger's previous meetings were filled with "intense intimidation of customers"⁴. The atmosphere was also under pressure to be able to express all their concerns about the SRB. The failure of Morton-Thiokol engineers to convey their concerns to NASA management and convince them to postpone the launch is a major factor that ultimately led to the disaster. Choosing to hide their concerns perhaps out of fear that managers won't listen to them regardless. There was also a major failure in communication between the ground crew and NASA management. The crew on the ground measured the thickness and temperature of the ice on the shuttle before launch. The recorded temperature was 8°F, much lower than the O-rings were designed for. However, this vital information was never relayed to NASA managers or engineers because the crew on the ground were only asked to report thickness, not temperature. Pressure on an Unrealistic Goal NASA had excessive pressure to increase flight speed, the increase would ultimately reduce NASA's ability to address urgent problems due to fewer employees dedicated to specific launch programs. This would also create pressure on NASA's management team to rush its judgment on critical issues that could potentially delay any launch schedule. The difficult flight plan portrayed the management team as if meeting the schedule was more important than astronaut safety. This is unethical as people's safety should always be the number one priority, especially when dealing with such an immense situation as going into space. Unsafe launch conditions As previously mentioned, the lack of communication between Morton Thiokol engineers and the NASA management team to make decisions played a major role in the Challenger disaster. The inability to reach a consensus between the two is what ultimately led to the shuttle launch. The ethical issue is that NASA chose to take a risk by launching the shuttle despite numerous requests to delay it. While delaying the launch certainly wouldn't please anyone, the decision was necessary to put the astronaut's safety first. According to the National Society of Professional Engineers, the most important principle is to “hold as paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public.” In any situation, when human life is potentially at stake, every single possible issue should be addressed before the mission or action takes place. NASA decided to move forward with the mission to meet the pressure)

Topic > Space Shuttle Challenger disaster In January 1986, 7 astronauts were killed when the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded just over a minute into the flight. The solid rocket booster's O-rings failed to seal properly, allowing hot combustible gases to escape from the side of the booster, burning through the external fuel tank. The factors that caused the O-ring to fail are multiple; including faulty design of solid rocket boosters, insufficient low-temperature testing of the O-ring material and the joints with which the O-ring sealed. Lack of proper communication between different levels of NASA management and various ethical issues ultimately led to the disaster. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay SRBs (solid rocket boosters) are key elements in the operation of the space shuttle, without them the shuttle produces insufficient thrust to overcome the Earth's gravitational pull to reach orbit. An SRB is attached to each side of the external fuel tank; each SRB joint is sealed by two O-rings; the lower and upper rings are known as primary and secondary rings respectively. The purpose of the O-rings is to prevent hot combustion gases from escaping from inside the engine. To create a barrier between the rubber O-rings and the combustion gases, a heat-resistant putty is applied to the inside of the joint. In general, solid rockets produce more thrust per pound than their liquid-fueled counterparts. However, there is a disadvantage. Once solid rocket fuel has been ignited, it cannot be turned off, much less controlled. Therefore, it is critical that the shuttle's SRBs have been designed correctly. Launch Delays The first delay of the Challenger mission was due to a weather front that was expected to move into that area, bringing rain and cold temperatures. Usually, a mission is not postponed until the weather enters the zone, however, the Vice President had to be present at the launch and NASA officials wanted to avoid the Vice President having to make an unnecessary trip to Florida, and so they the launch was postponed early. The Vice President was a key spokesperson for the President in the space program, and NASA coveted his goodwill. The weather front stalled; the launch window had perfect conditions, but the launch had already been postponed. As shown in Figure 2², the lowest temperature experienced by O-rings on any previous mission was 53℉, showing no temperature data lower than this recorded temperature. Bob Lund concluded that 53℉ was the only low-temperature data Morton-Thiokol had for the effects of low temperatures on operational boosters, so since his engineers had no low-temperature data below 53℉, they could not prove that it was dangerous to launch at lower temperatures. Another delay was caused by a faulty microswitch in the hatch closing mechanism and problems in removing the hatch handle. However, once these issues were resolved, the winds became too strong and the weather front began to move again, bringing record low temperatures to the Florida area.Analysis of thelaunchAccording to the book 'The Final Voyage', temperatures overnight before launch dropped as low as 8℉, much lower than expected. Safety showers and fire hoses had been activated to prevent freezing of water pipes in the launch pad. Ice had formed all over the platform, so there were concerns that ice would fall off the platform during launch and damage the shuttle's heat-resistant tiles. The ice inspection saw this as a major concern, but the launch director decided to move forward with the countdown. Post Launch Analysis At launch, the impact of the ignition unleashed a shower of ice from the platform, striking the left booster. Although there was no evidence of ice damage on the Orbiter itself, NASA's analysis of the ice problem was wrong. The primary O-ring was too cold to seal properly, the heat-resistant putty protecting the O-rings from the fuel collapsed, and thus gases above 5000℉ burned past both O-rings. Eight hundredths of a second after ignition, the shuttle took off. The camera focused on the right booster and showed approximately 9 puffs of smoke coming from the booster at the rear field joint. Oxides from the burned propellant temporarily sealed the joint before the flames could escape. Issues arising from the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster As young engineering students, what future do we see for professional responsibilities as engineers? Public welfare? Remain faithful to your work? It is important that experienced engineers such as those placed in management positions do not completely ignore their own experience and consider the decisions and understandings of younger practicing engineers. As for technical matters, practicing engineers will be more up-to-date. Another problem is the fact that managers encouraged the launch, due to insufficient cold temperature data. Since there was not enough data to make an informed decision, in their opinion it was not appropriate to abort the launch. In a previous issue, NASA was alerted to problems in the booster's design, but did not halt the program until the problem was resolved. On the one hand, testing the implications of designs is always an important priority to ensure the safety of the shuttle. . However, they must also be aware of their obligation to society to protect public welfare. The public supplied the engineers, through the tax base and legislation. In return, engineers have a responsibility to protect the safety and welfare of the public in all their endeavors. According to the ASME Code of Ethics, the first canon urges engineers to "consider the safety, health, and welfare of the public paramount in the performance of their professional duties." The welfare and safety of the public should be at the top of the priority list. While corporate loyalty is important, it should not override the engineer's obligations to the public. If engineers demonstrated the utmost selfish or altruistic loyalty towards engineering, it could lead to the most unfortunate consequences. Ethical Issues of the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster Professional Responsibility One of the major ethical issues was the professional responsibility of design engineers. Design engineers have a responsibility to keep designs flawless and professional, however, there are implications such as the costs of building and obtaining items to complete the project. Since the design team projectcould potentially delay the completion of the scheduled Challenger shuttle mission, the execution window was very short. From an ethical standpoint, it seemed like the rushed schedule portrayed the management team as not even being concerned about the astronaut's safety. According to software and recent Challenger historian Richard Feynman, it seemed that engineering could only be as good as management. . For the Challenger to become a more complete design, management would have to agree and listen to the issues raised by the engineers; they simply ignored the problems. Yes, the engineers had to work under a time limit, but the management team stood in their way of doing what they were capable of. Effective Communication Another major ethical factor that contributed to the disaster was the lack of effective communication between engineers and management. After the incident, Roger Boisjoly, an engineer who worked for Morton-Thiokol, said the challenger's previous meetings were filled with "intense intimidation of customers"⁴. The atmosphere was also under pressure to be able to express all their concerns about the SRB. The failure of Morton-Thiokol engineers to convey their concerns to NASA management and convince them to postpone the launch is a major factor that ultimately led to the disaster. Choosing to hide their concerns perhaps out of fear that managers won't listen to them regardless. There was also a major failure in communication between the ground crew and NASA management. The crew on the ground measured the thickness and temperature of the ice on the shuttle before launch. The recorded temperature was 8°F, much lower than the O-rings were designed for. However, this vital information was never relayed to NASA managers or engineers because the crew on the ground were only asked to report thickness, not temperature. Pressure on an Unrealistic Goal NASA had excessive pressure to increase flight speed, the increase would ultimately reduce NASA's ability to address urgent problems due to fewer employees dedicated to specific launch programs. This would also create pressure on NASA's management team to rush its judgment on critical issues that could potentially delay any launch schedule. The difficult flight plan portrayed the management team as if meeting the schedule was more important than astronaut safety. This is unethical as people's safety should always be the number one priority, especially when dealing with such an immense situation as going into space. Unsafe launch conditions As previously mentioned, the lack of communication between Morton Thiokol engineers and the NASA management team to make decisions played a major role in the Challenger disaster. The inability to reach a consensus between the two is what ultimately led to the shuttle launch. The ethical issue is that NASA chose to take a risk by launching the shuttle despite numerous requests to delay it. While delaying the launch certainly wouldn't please anyone, the decision was necessary to put the astronaut's safety first. According to the National Society of Professional Engineers, the most important principle is to “hold as paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public.” In any situation, when human life is potentially at stake, every single possible issue should be addressed before the mission or action takes place. NASA decided to move forward with the mission to meet the pressure)